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1. Introduction 
In the field of strategy, the resources/capabilities/competence approach (henceforth RCC 
approach) has emerged as a powerful current with a sizable body of literature, whose proponents claim has 
the potential to offer a unifying paradigm for a highly fragmented field (Volberda & Elfring, 2001). Many 
writers erroneously refer to it as the resource-based approach, but other labels, such as the capabilities-
based approach, dynamic capabilities or competence approach have also been used. This paper argues that 
the RCC approach, which is often portrayed as a single integrated school of thought, consists of three 
distinct research programs that exhibit some similarities, but also house non-trivial differences. This re-
structuring of the RCC approach is based on a thorough epistemological analysis and a re-interpretation of 
Penrose’s 1959 classic. The purpose of this paper is threefold: First to give an overview of the current state 
of the art in all three research programs, secondly to show the most important commonalities and 
differences between them and lastly to discuss the strengths and weaknesses of each school and to point 
the way to areas where each is most fit to contribute.  
  The three distinct schools of the RCC approach will be differentiated according to a set of 
dimensions spanning several levels of inquiry, including the epistemological, methodological and 
conceptual (substantive) levels. The three schools are: (1) the rational-equilibrium school, which mainly 
consists of the resource based view of the firm; (2) the behavioral-evolutionary school, exemplified in the 
capabilities approach, and specifically the Dynamic Capabilities research program; and (3) the social 
constructionist school, which includes the Core Competence approach as well as other earlier 
contributions.  
  A meta-goal of this study thus is to show, how bringing to the surface the fundamental 
assumptions, which are very rarely explicitly discussed, aids in deepening our understanding of the 
literature and our appreciation of subtle but critical differences in the three approaches. Further dimensions 
such as assumptions about managers’ rationality, the portrayed relation of the firm with its environment, 
the degree of strategic choice imputed to firm management and the criteria under focus in managers’ 
strategic decisions are discussed for each school. In addition to presenting a useful structure that helps 
readers make sense of the vast literature within the RCC approach, the proposed typology produces some 
interesting findings that illuminate a hitherto unrecognized central and critical aspect of Penrose’s   2
contribution. The paper will specifically discuss the pros and cons of employing economic methods in the 
study of strategy, a topic that Penrose had rather unusual and conveniently overlooked ideas about. 
  Differentiating between the schools and their characteristics is not a simple task, partly because the 
RCC approach is characterized by a proliferation of terms and concepts, and in most cases different 
authors are using different terms to describe the same or very similar concepts. This review will preserve 
each author’s original terminology. However, it will try to contribute to reducing the confusion in terms by 
pointing out the similarities in the underlying concepts, so that one may discriminate the substantive from 
the merely semantic differences. This paper also provides a nuanced review of the RCC approach, which 
builds on previous attempts at mapping the field (Sanchez, 2001; Schulze, 1994; Mahoney & Pandian, 
1992). However, the current study goes beyond previous reviews in its recourse to epistemology, which 
allows the delineation of a constructionist stream that has not previously been recognized as a distinct 
school. The constructionist school provides an explanation for the divide that some authors have sensed in 
the RCC approach (Schulze, 1994; Foss, 1997) but for which they could provide no adequate explanation. 
Hardly recognized in the literature is the insight that Penrose’s views on management and the growth of 
firms are intimately related to this constructionist school. This constructionist school is in many instances 
incorrectly subsumed under the behavioral-evolutionary school due to some similarities in the content of 
the two schools. 
  After this introduction, we revisit Penrose’s 1959 classic, which sets the foundation upon which 
the RCC approach has been built. A correct understanding of Penrose proves to be pivotal in the mapping 
of the RCC approach into three distinct schools. Next, we devote a section to each of the three schools 
respectively, followed by the concluding section.  
 
2.  Edith Penrose as the Foundation 
The contributions of Penrose are often mentioned, but very rarely explicitly discussed and in our 
view always misunderstood. A complete re-interpretation of her work is needed, which in turn necessitates 
a complete overhaul of the research which purportedly is carried out with Penrose’s work as the basis.  
The heterogeneity of firms with respect to their resources had been emphasized by Chamberlin as 
early as the 1930s (Fahy, 2000). However, it was Penrose’s landmark, The Theory of the Growth of the   3
Firm (1959) that clearly laid the foundational ideas of the RCC approach in strategy. For over twenty 
years, the work of Penrose was not recognized as a breakthrough and was not given due attention in 
economics and in management. In the early 1980s, however, several scholars published papers drawing on 
some of Penrose’s ideas and this stream soon came to be called the resource-based view of the firm 
(henceforth the RBV). The name was coined by Birger Wernerfelt in his 1984 article under the same title, 
however, the term is inspired by Penrose’s (1959) notion that the firm should be regarded as a bundle of 
resources. By accepting Penrose’s starting point (the firm is a bundle of resources), but not incorporating 
her following ideas about the futility of conventional economic methods in analyzing the implications of 
the resource-view, the RBV set itself an impossible task. It is thus necessary to first give a brief overview 
of Penrose’s main ideas, and later to return to the issue of how each school relates to Penrose. The 
foundation that Penrose established for the RCC approach consists of four basic ideas: (1) viewing the firm 
in terms of its resources; (2) explicating the sources of firm heterogeneity; (3) the creation process of 
idiosyncratic firm resources; (4) the trigger behind firm expansion and the basis for diversification. These 
ideas need to be explained at some length because a false interpretation of her ideas is quite entrenched in 
scholars’ minds. We will be using a large number of direct quotations to show that there is indeed very 
little room for interpreting what Penrose really said. 
Penrose defined the firm as a bundle of resources. The importance of this contribution from the 
point of view of strategy is that managing the firm is essentially managing a set of tangible and intangible 
resources. Penrose looks particularly to the productive services that are available to the firm from the use 
of its resources, and asserts that these are not the same for different firms, even if the resources are 
identical. This is because of a two-way interaction:  
“It is shown not only that the resources with which a particular firm is accustomed to working will 
shape the productive services its management is capable of rendering,(…), but also that the 
experience of management will affect the productive services that all its other resources are 
capable of rendering.” (Penrose, 1959:5) 
These productive services depend on the “function” or “activity” for which the resources are used, 
as well as the type of other resources they are combined with and the manner in which they are combined. 
“It is largely in this distinction [between resources and the services they render] that we find the source of   4
the uniqueness of each individual firm”
 (Penrose, 1959:25) This heterogeneity arises from the possession 
of different resources, but more importantly from the varying services that firms derive from similar 
resources, as a result of the particular ways in which the resources are employed within the idiosyncratic 
circumstances of each firm. Coming from an economist, this view of the firm is a great leap because the 
classical view of the firm in mainstream economics is based on the representative firm premise. In the 
economic theory of the firm, firms are typically seen as identical, represented by a production function, in 
which resources enter as quantities of homogenous inputs. Also noteworthy is the focus on the inside of 
the firm not the market surrounding it which is another important new contribution of Penrose.  
Regarding the creation process of idiosyncratic firm resources, Penrose put forth the key idea that 
new services are continuously being created out of the firm’s resources. Further, she argues that these 
services are never fully utilized by the firm’s productive operations, and that unused services exist in every 
firm. She gives three reasons why this is always the case: the indivisibility of resources; the specialized use 
of resources; and the observation that in the course of normal firm operations, new services from existing 
resources are continually being created (Penrose, 1959:68) This happens because some resources, mainly 
human resources, exhibit services that are inherently heterogeneous. Every time the service is rendered it is 
unique, and with each unique exercise of a service, new knowledge is created.  
“The number of entrepreneurial man-hours has surely very little relation to the ‘amount’ of 
service rendered… An idea produced, a decision made, an important employee grievance settled, 
are each a unique operation of value in the organization of production – services performed which 
cannot be repeated.” (Penrose, 1959:75) 
Since it is the human resources that put the organization’s material resources to use, the services 
rendered by the material resources are also heterogeneous depending on the various ways in which the 
organization’s members use them. The increase in knowledge and experience results in continuous 
creation of new productive services
1.  
“The possibilities of using services change with changes in knowledge. More services become 
available, previously unused services become employed and employed services become unused as 
                                            
1 Penrose must also be credited with introducing knowledge (the product of a learning process) to the debate. The two 
more economically inclined approaches struggle unsuccessfully with incorporating knowledge production, while the 
Core Competence approach made it its central theme.   5
knowledge increases about the physical characteristics of resources, about ways of using them, or 
about products it would be profitable to use them for. […] That the knowledge possessed by the 
firm’s personnel tends to increase automatically with experience means, therefore, that the 
available productive services from a firm’s resources will also tend to change.” (Penrose, 
1959:76)  
The fourth of Penrose’s foundational ideas is that the principal motive that lies behind expansion 
and diversification, and thus the root of firms’ growth can be found in the firm’s unique resources. 
Expansion and diversification provide profitable ways to utilize the unused services that the firm’s 
resources provide. Penrose suggests that the type of resources available in the firm determines the direction 
of expansion, or what kind of products/services the firm will consider producing when it expands or 
diversifies (Penrose, 1959:82). In innovation, although entrepreneurs only develop products for which they 
anticipate considerable consumer demand, the prime force suggesting what new products to produce is not 
what customers want, but rather what the unique productive services rendered by the firm’s resources can 
produce. As such, Penrose’s outlook is more in the spirit of Schumpeterian economics.  
“Unused productive services are, for the enterprising firm, at the same time a challenge to 
innovate, an incentive to expand, and a source of competitive advantage. They facilitate the 
introduction of new combinations of resources – innovation – within the firm. The new 
combinations may be combinations of services for the production of new products, new processes 
for the production of old products, new organization of administrative functions.” (Penrose, 
1959:85-86)  
In addition to spurring growth, Penrose proposes that the firm’s managerial resources impose 
limits on the extent of firm growth, which has been referred to later as the ‘Penrose effect’ (Marris, 1963; 
Shen 1970).    
  Each of the three schools identified in this study draws on some aspects of Penrose’s views albeit 
to varying degrees. This will become apparent in the following sections which review the main 
characteristics of each school. It is interesting to note that among the three schools, the rational-equilibrium 
RBV, displays the least resemblance to Penrose’s growth theory, despite the common view in the literature 
that Penrose is the pioneer of the RBV. It is shown below that Penrose is truly a pioneer, but not of the   6
RBV. The behavioral-evolutionary school bears a closer resemblance to Penrose than the RBV, but 
delving deeper than the surface leads one to conclude that the constructionist school shares a very similar 
philosophical view that underlies Penrose’s approach to management and firm growth. The following 
analysis of the three schools will argue that the constructionist school is the modern, true, and fruitful 
extension of Penrose’s insights, which is not currently recognized as such in the literature dealing with the 
RCC approach.  
Some authors (Foss 1996, 1999, 2000; Schulze, 1994) have sensed a schism in the RCC approach 
that separates a static, equilibrium-based version of the resource-based argument that draws on formal 
economics, from a dynamic, process oriented version. Although the extant characterization of the divide 
shares some common elements with the analysis presented here, it is deemed inaccurate as it misses out on 
important epistemological distinctions to be revealed shortly. An alternative typology will be proposed that 
identifies a third school related to the RCC approach distinguishable from the other two by its 
constructionist epistemological framework. It is shown that Penrose employs an unmistakable 
constructionist epistemology in her Theory of the Growth of the Firm, an aspect that is at the core of her 
argument. This dimension of Penrose’s thinking is at odds with the formal economic framework 
underlying the RBV and therefore had to be dropped in RBV accounts. This observation increases the gulf 
between Penrose and the RBV and refutes the allegation that the latter is an outgrowth of Penrose. Another 
interesting finding concerns the surprising lack of recognition of the constructionist inclination of 
Penrose’s theory. It seems that this epistemological dimension has escaped the attention of the majority of 
prominent scholars working on the RCC approach simply because Penrose preceded constructionism by a 
good 20 years. Accordingly, publications embracing the constructionist view, the salient example here 
being the work of Hamel & Prahalad on Core Competences, are mistakenly grouped in the 
behavioral/evolutionary school for their focus on dynamic aspects and for the absence of formal economic 
theorizing from their work. These misunderstandings will be clarified in the following sections. First, 
however, our claim that Penrose is following a constructionist epistemological frame must be 
substantiated. 
The constructionist inclination becomes apparent in at least two major aspects of her work. First, 
in the way Penrose explicates the relation of the firm to its environment, secondly in her definition of the   7
productive opportunity of the firm and her identification of the determinants of market demand. It is also 
accentuated in how she incorporates knowledge, and particularly tacit knowledge in the determination of 
the productive services that firms extract from their resources. In the ensuing analysis, the prolific use of 
quotes from the original text is intended to help the reader witness first-hand the constructionist character 
of the arguments. The direct quotations will also help readers to immediately understand the massive 
differences between her work and that of both the rational-equilibrium RBV and the behavioral-
evolutionary school. 
  Penrose explicitly states that the environment relevant to her study of the growth of business 
organizations is the subjective environment created in the cognition of the entrepreneur/manager. For 
Penrose, the objective environment that economists observe and measure is irrelevant given that the aim is 
to explain the behavior of firms and their managers. 
 “In order to focus attention on the crucial role of a firm’s ‘inherited’ resources, the environment 
is treated, in the first instance, as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind of the possibilities and 
restrictions with which he is confronted, for it is, after all, such an ‘image’ which in fact 
determines a man’s behavior; whether experience confirms expectations is another story.” 
(Penrose, 1959:5) 
This by no means implies that taking a subjective cognitive view leads us to live in a dream world. Penrose 
emphasizes the importance of a subjective view because it is these cognitive constructions that determine 
the actions of managers. The collective enactment of reality rooted in subjective individual and social 
cognition shape both the organization and the environment.  
“In the last analysis the ‘environment’ rejects or confirms the soundness of judgments about it, but 
the relevant environment is not an objective fact discoverable before the event; economists cannot 
predict it unless they can predict the ways in which a firm’s actions will themselves ‘change’ the 
relevant environment in the future. In any event, what the economist sees may be very different 
from what an individual firm sees, and it is the latter, not the former, that is pertinent to an 
explanation of a firm’s behavior.” (Penrose, 1959:41) 
  This view has profound implications for the way firm behavior and competitive advantage is 
researched. The objective methods of economics that attempt to derive covering laws and calculable   8
outcomes cannot work. According to Penrose, the focus of analysis should shift to the cognition of the firm 
and its environment happening on the managerial individual and organizational level. This is the view 
taken in the social constructionist school. Accordingly, strategy starts from the inside of the organization 
first, and then proceeds to the outside. 
“We shall be interested in the environment as an ‘image’ in the entrepreneur’s mind (...). The 
factors affecting the relation between the ‘image’ and ‘reality’ are not being ignored, but for an 
analysis of the growth of firms it is appropriate to start from an analysis of the firm rather than of 
the environment and then proceed to a discussion of the effect of certain types of environmental 
conditions. If we can discover what determines entrepreneurial ideas about what the firm can and 
cannot do, that is, what determines the nature and extent of the ‘subjective’ productive opportunity 
of the firm, we can at least know where to look if we want to explain or to predict the actions of 
particular firms. ” (Penrose, 1959:42) 
  In this view of strategy-making, the firm does not take the environment as a given. Rather, firms 
and their managers enact the organization and the environment. Thus, the organization is an active creator 
rather than a reactive adapting entity that is continuously struggling to shape itself according to the dictates 
of a forceful environment.  
“Firms not only alter the environmental conditions necessary for the success of their actions, but, 
even more important, they know that they can alter them and that the environment is not 
independent of their own activities. Within the unknowable limits placed by the environment on 
successful action there is a wide scope for judgment.” (Penrose, 1959:42) 
  This view brings back a great deal of strategic choice to the organization and its members and 
managers. It stands in stark contrast with the extreme form of environmental determinism implied in such 
theories as population ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977), institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) or 
neoclassical perfect competition, where the activities of organizations and their members are depicted as 
mere reactions to powerful environmental forces that determine the correct behavior of a surviving 
organization. Other approaches, such as the classical SWOT approach, the positioning approach (Porter, 
1980), or approaches originating in organizational economics (IO, TCE, evolutionary theory) take on a 
milder form of environmental determinism where the organization is portrayed as acting and being acted   9
upon. Penrose does not take the middle of the road here, but is firmly in the constructionist camp putting 
more emphasis on what the firm does with its environment, how it enacts itself and its surroundings and 
the power it has to construct this environment. This view is apparent in the following quotes, in which 
Penrose explains that the productive opportunity of the firm is a purely subjective matter, rather than the 
objective exhaustive technical production frontier commonly used by economists. Even market demand, 
which is normally treated as an exogenous variable, and a force that determines a firm’s strategic 
marketing and production plans, is considered in the constructionist approach an endogenous variable.  
 “Although the ‘objective’ productive opportunity of a firm is limited by what the firm is able to 
accomplish, the ‘subjective’ productive opportunity is a question of what it thinks it can 
accomplish. ‘Expectations’ and not ‘objective facts’ are the immediate determinants of a firm’s 
behavior, although there may be a relationship between expectations and ‘facts’ – indeed there 
must be if action is to be successful, for the success of a firm’s plans depends only partly on the 
execution of them and partly on whether they are based on sound judgment about the possibilities 
for successful action.” (Penrose, 1959:41)  
 
   “The really enterprising entrepreneur has not often, so far as we can see, taken demand as ‘given’ 
but rather as something he ought to be able to do something about.” (Penrose, 1959:80) 
 
 “  Once it is recognized that the ‘demand’ with which an entrepreneur is concerned when he makes 
his production plans is nothing more nor less than his own ideas about what he can sell at various 
prices with varying degrees of selling effort, then we ought to consider what influences the 
development of those ideas. For if entrepreneurial notions about what consumers ought to like 
have some influence on what is offered to consumers and therefore on what they do in fact like, or 
learn to like, a mere inquiry into the ‘state of demand’ will not enable us to understand the 
productive activity of entrepreneurs and, in particular, their innovating activity.” (Penrose, 
1959:81)  
  It is expected to find various interpretations of a classic such as The Theory of the Growth of the 
Firm. However, what is unique in the case of Penrose, is that what is arguably the most important (and at   10
the time she wrote, novel) dimension of her work is virtually dropped, as it was completely impossible to 
fit within the dominant economic frame that shaped the resource-based view subsequently. If the market 
does not shape the structure and strategy of the firm, economic theory is futile for the analysis of the firm’s 
growth as creativity, chance and learning cannot be incorporated in the formal models economics has to 
offer (maybe with Ludwig von Mises’s praxeology as an exception). Penrose emphasizes, as shown in the 
quotes above, that it is the subjective outlook of the entrepreneur that should take precedence, and that 
scholars need to examine more seriously the notion that the direction of causality may flow more 
forcefully from the ‘inside’ to the ‘outside’ of the organization, or in other words from the individual and 
collective actions of organizational members to the world. When it comes to strategy prediction, not 
explanation, is important. Penrose made it clear that she does not believe in economics’ predictive power, 
instead she focused on the active creative powers of the firm’s members. 
 
3.  The Rational-Equilibrium School 
During the 1980s and early 1990s, some economists and strategy scholars wrote papers in business 
policy focusing on the heterogeneity of firm resources as an explanation for sustained economic rents, and 
as grounds for diversification. This collectivity of ideas was eventually dubbed the resource-based view 
(RBV) of the firm, and of strategic management, after the title of Wernerfelt’s seminal article (1984), 
which is (arbitrarily) taken to mark the birth of the RBV. This section first presents a review of the basic 
ideas and logic of the RBV, followed by an analysis of its fundamental assumptions, epistemology and 
methodology. The extent to which the RBV draws on Penrose’s thinking as well as its strong and weak 
points are discussed. We will present the rational-equilibrium school as being synonymous with the RBV, 
which provokes the question, why the need for another fancy label? The reason we insist on the ‘rational-
equilibrium’ label is two-fold. First, the label is in harmony with the core epistemological and 
methodological criteria we use to differentiate between the three schools. The second reason is the 
confusion that abounds in the literature concerning the resource-based view and the work that constitutes 
it. Some authors equate the RBV with the whole RCC approach, and consider all the literature described 
under the three schools to belong to the RBV (Spender, 1994; Foss, 1997). However, we agree with Jay   11
Barney when he claims that the RBV is more limited in its origin, which is rooted in the interaction among 
some economists and strategists at UCLA, and is specifically characterized by its economic character.  
 
3.1  A Conceptual Outline of the Rational-Equilibrium School 
Wernerfelt’s seminal paper (1984) proposed a view of the firm that focuses on resources rather 
than products, in line with Penrose (1959). RBV scholars viewed firm resources as causes of monopolistic 
or efficiency advantages, and thus differential performance across firms (Wernerfelt, 1984; Rumelt, 1991). 
The firm-specific resources were also viewed as a reason for firms to diversify into markets in which these 
resources were important inputs (Teece, 1980; 1982). The most important theoretical contributions in the 
RBV sought to describe the characteristics that resources need to display to earn rents, which in economics 
refer to profits over and above the price of obtaining the resource. They also explain the different types of 
rents and sketch the factors that account for the sustainability of the rent streams in equilibrium.  
  Although various definitions have been put forth as to what is meant by resources, Barney’s 
definition captures most of what is found in the RBV literature. According to Barney (1991)  
“… firm resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and implement 
strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991:101)  
  This definition is in line with the strengths that feature in the internal analysis part of the SWOT 
model of Harvard style strategy, and from it is derived the first characteristic of rent generating resources, 
namely that they must be valuable to the firm. Barney further classifies resources into physical (capital 
equipment, physical technology, geographic location, raw materials), human capital  
“…training, experience, judgment, intelligence, relationships and insight of individual managers 
and workers in the firm” and organizational, “…a firm’s reporting structure, its formal and 
informal planning, controlling and coordinating systems, informal relations among groups within 
a firm and between a firm and those in its environment” (Barney, 1991:101)  
  This comprehensive definition of resources implies that almost anything inside a firm can be a 
source of advantage, and hence the importance of further specification of the characteristics of rent 
generating resources. These characteristics were deduced using the basic economic logic of neoclassical   12
price theory. The competitive conditions affecting the supply and demand of resources in strategic resource 
(factor) markets determined which resources would command monopoly rents due to market power 
considerations (Wernerfelt 1984). Barney proposed that strategically valuable resources had to be rare, 
because the fewer the number of firms possessing the valuable resources, the higher the degree of 
competitive advantage that accrues to a firm possessing the resource (of course relative to demand) 
(Barney, 1991). The rare resource commands what economists call Ricardian rents (Castanias & Helfat, 
1991), such as the case of a superior location of a store at the corner of two main streets. Besides being 
rare, an asset may yield more productive value when combined with the asset base of a specific firm, than 
when it is used in other firms. Economists refer to the extra return as a quasi-rent, which is the difference 
in rent between the first and second best uses of the resource (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). These specific 
assets are said to be imperfectly mobile, because although they can be sold on the market, they earn a 
higher value when used in the firm. Imperfect mobility assures that the resources are ‘sticky’ to the firm 
and can thus be a source of competitive advantage (Peteraf, 1993). If resources are mobile (not sticky) their 
price is bid up and extra rents are appropriated by the resource owner, rather than by the firm. In a widely 
cited article, Dierickx & Cool (1989) ask a fundamental question: Are all strategic factors bought and sold 
on markets? They claim that indeed the most important strategic resources, such as reputation, are not, and 
no markets exist for them. As such, it is not factor market imperfection, but rather incompleteness that is 
the key issue. “Being nontradable, the firm-specific component is accumulated internally… by choosing 
appropriate time paths of flows over a period of time.” (Dierickx & Cool, 1989:1505) This means that a 
firm with an accumulated stock of valuable resources must deploy them in product markets in order to 
acquire their rent potential. It also means that firms lacking these resource stocks cannot simply buy them; 
they must expend the time, effort and investment to build them internally (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). 
Relevant examples here are customer loyalty, goodwill, trust between the firm and its suppliers or 
customers, and teamwork among members of the firm. 
  The RBV does not explicitly deal with the processes by which firms can endogenously create, 
build or otherwise acquire valuable, rent generating resources. Barney (1986) assumes the existence of 
markets for strategic resources, albeit imperfect markets. Peteraf (1993) emphasizes the necessity of ex 
ante limits to competition in the relevant factor markets for acquiring particular resources (Peteraf, 1993).   13
These imperfections may be monopolistic and related to market power, which is consistent with Bain style 
IO, or they may be informational in nature, consistent with the new IO of the Chicago school (Connor 
1991). Barney (1986) states that if the value of resources needed to implement successful strategies was 
perfectly known, their potential return would be competed away in their price, and there would be no 
abnormal returns. Barney mentions several important causes of competitive imperfections in strategic 
factor markets (such as uniqueness). However, he reduces all of the causes to a simple dichotomy of 
perfectly accurate expectations about the future value potential of the resource versus pure luck. According 
to Barney, a firm buys a resource because it is able to forecast the future value of the resource better than 
other firms (due to information asymmetries and the costs of acquiring information), or it acquires a 
resource by luck, which turns out to have superior value in the future (Barney, 1986). Dierickx & Cool 
propose that firms accumulate strategic resources in the firm by deliberate investments, such as the case of 
R&D (Dierickx & Cool, 1989).  
  Besides understanding the characteristics of rent-generating resources, contributors to the RBV 
have elucidated several mechanisms that enable firms to sustain the superior returns from their unique 
resources. The RBV justification for persistent heterogeneity in firm returns rests on two main pillars: 
strategic factor market imperfections; and factors that deter imitation or substitution of strategic resources 
that generate rents. Superior return can be sustained in equilibrium only when competitive imperfections 
persist. Peteraf (1993) explains four necessary conditions: heterogeneity in firm resource sets; ex ante 
limits to competition in acquiring the valuable resource are necessary, so that the cost of acquiring it does 
not offset the rents it generates; ex post limits to competition over these rents once a particular firm has 
acquired, and finally, imperfect mobility makes these resources specific to the firm so that the rents are 
shared by the firm and the resource owner (Peteraf, 1993). Wernerfelt approaches the sustainability 
question from the strategic positioning perspective, utilizing Porter’s Five forces model and the BCG 
growth-share matrix, but applying them to resources rather than products. Wernerfelt concludes that for a 
resource to obtain a sustainable rent stream, the firm must build resource position barriers, similar to entry 
barriers in product markets (Mason, Bain) and mobility barriers in strategic groups of firms (Porter, 
Caves). Although market imperfections and incomplete markets (for non-tradable resources) prevent 
competitors from buying the rent-generating resource, they may try to imitate resources of strategic   14
importance (Peteraf, 1993). Hence, Barney emphasizes that if resources are to be the basis for a sustained 
advantage, they must be imperfectly imitable and non-substitutable by competitors. RBV scholars have 
elaborated a set of factors that make it difficult or impossible for competitors to imitate or substitute the 
rent generating resources; these are explained next.  
Lippman & Rumelt (1982) present a formal model of uncertain imitability, which is based on the 
idea that uncertainty plagues the sources of potential rent, such as technological changes, discoveries and 
inventions, changes in consumer tastes or changes in laws and regulations. With uncertainty, Lippman & 
Rumelt propose a list of isolating mechanisms, such as causal ambiguity, which preserve the disparities in 
firm profits in the long run due to prevention of entry or imitation. While causal ambiguity deters imitation 
by challenging competitors’ understanding of the important links among resources and sustainable 
competitive advantage, social complexity is another deterrence mechanism that poses a challenge to 
competitors’ ability to control a resource, even if they can understand how it relates to the achievement of 
superior performance. Castanias & Helfat (1991) present the firm’s top management team as a rent-
generating resource that embodies both causal ambiguity and social complexity. Dierickx & Cool (1989) 
offer four, slightly more technical, factors that deter imitation, namely time compression diseconomies, 
asset mass efficiencies, interconnectedness of asset stocks and asset erosion.  
 
3.2  The Underlying Framework of the Rational-Equilibrium School  
  The above review has covered the main conceptual building blocks of the rational equilibrium 
RBV. The following analysis strives to go beyond the concepts, to examine the underlying epistemology 
and basic assumptions. This provides for a deeper understanding of the school and facilitates the 
comparison with the other schools.  
As explained above, the central concern in the school is to describe the characteristics of resources 
that command rents, and to account for the sustainability of those rents under equilibrium. The resource-
based explanations draw primarily on neoclassical price theory, but present a more sophisticated picture, in 
which several types of market imperfections produce the possibility for different types of rent. Equilibrium 
is at the core of the analysis, as it serves as the benchmark against which above-normal returns are 
measured – normal here referring to the return under near-perfect competitive conditions. Equilibrium also   15
marks the horizon for when an above-normal return (competitive advantage) is considered long lasting, or 
sustained. Barney (1991) defines a sustained advantage independent of time: it depends on the number and 
severity of attempts at duplication. As such, RBV contributions such as Wernerfelt (1984) and Barney 
(1991) may be considered an extension of mainstream IO economics and of Porter’s industry structure 
approach, applied to the case of resource/factor markets instead of product markets. In keeping with 
Chicago IO, neoclassical price theory and competition are central concepts, in which costly information 
and differences in production/distribution efficiency are used to explain firm size and scope (Connor, 
1991). Foss (2000) emphasizes the influence of Harold Demsetz of UCLA, who is a prominent contributor 
to Chicago IO, and whose 1973 article “Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy” anticipates 
many of the main RBV ideas. Therefore, in terms of base discipline, the RBV stems from IO economics, in 
either of its two versions (the Bain/Porter/Caves IO or the Chicago/Demsetz IO). Jay Barney, a key 
contributor to the RBV, has argued against rational reconstructions of the RBV that tie its early literature 
to Selznick (1957), Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962), which he calls ‘a myth’. He clarifies that the 
RBV actually “…owes its origin to the interaction, mainly at UCLA, between such economists and 
strategy scholars as William Ouchi, Michael Porter, Richard Rumelt, Oliver Williamson, Sidney Winter 
and Barney himself.” (Foss, 2000:21) To summarize, two traditions within the RBV are noted; one 
drawing on market power explanations in keeping with Bain IO, the new IO based on game theory, and 
consistent with the Porter/Caves industry structure approach to strategy; and the other drawing on 
efficiency based explanations in the Chicago IO tradition and in Harold Demsetz’s work. These two 
traditions are considered to be highly differentiated within IO economics, and according to strategy 
scholars such as Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997). However, there is adequate reason to argue that despite 
some differences, there are more important commonalities in the underlying analytical logic, as well as in 
the epistemological basis, as is shown next. 
The disciplinary base of IO economics and the analytical framework provided by neoclassical 
price theory displays a system of assumptions about the industrial and business world and about the actors 
that constitute it. This system of assumptions starts out with the portrayal of an almost perfectly 
competitive and predictable world, and subsequently starts to introduce some imperfections that explain 
certain aspects of firm behavior.    16
“Consistent with neoclassical economics, this school describes economic activity as occurring 
within efficient markets whose parameters of behavior are presumed to be known, or at least, 
knowable. Important sources of change are presumed to be exogenous – since that which is 
endogenous is presumed known or knowable and is thus reflected in current conduct … The 
portrait is not that of static markets – perpetually at or near equilibrium – but rather of a stable 
system in which competitive advantage is quickly eroded and in which previous conduct is a 
valuable guide to future conduct.” (Schulze, 1994:134)  
Foss (1999) argues that the core logic is the same in both traditions of the RBV, based on competitive 
advantage being conceptualized as rents sustained in equilibrium. Further, “…the ‘trick’ with which these 
rents are generated is in both cases the time-honored one of throwing one or two spanners into the works 
of an otherwise perfect world … these spanners in the works are essentially informational in nature,” and 
are chosen by the analyst as the relevant factor market imperfections that underlie product market 
advantages (Foss, 1999:93).  
The view presented by the RBV (rational-equilibrium) school, and consistent with IO economics 
as its base discipline, displays a positivist epistemology and methodology. Objective knowledge of the 
relevant parameters is assumed to be obtainable and can be accurately displayed in precise mathematical 
forms according to hypothetico-deductive methodology (Blaug, 1992). For a social science this is 
unacceptable. In fact, economics pretends to be a formal science (like mathematics) which is clearly not 
the case. Firms (and their managers) are assumed to behave rationally, according to the precise 
maximization of profit functions and minimization of cost functions subject to the technological 
constraints of the firm’s production function, where the parameters are objective and measurable. All firms 
and managers are presumed to choose the best out of all possible alternatives according to this single 
optimizing rationality, and thus their behavior is highly predictable, as well as the market behavior, which 
is described by the concept of equilibrium. The whole system can be expressed in a deterministic 
mathematical model that is accurate in explaining and predicting its outcomes – the prices and quantities of 
products in the market system. This determinism eliminates the capacity of management to produce 
superior performance (Helfat et al., 2007) except for identifying and acquiring control over those assets 
that command rents. Barney proposes that a firm either acquires rent generating resources as a result of   17
pure luck, or as a result of superior information (Barney, 1986). There is no discussion of how these 
resources can be applied in different ways or how firms can create rent generating resources endogenously. 
This gives the RBV a primarily retrospective focus and results in a view of the competitive environment 
where there is one technically optimal way to act to obtain sustainable rents, and where emphasis is placed 
on imitation and appropriation (rather than substitution). Thus, competition leads to isomorphism (Schulze, 
1994) which in turn leads to unhealthy hypercompetition (Porter, 1996:61-62). The assumption of 
rationality and the use of equilibrium-based analysis assume away complexity since the calculative powers 
imputed to actors allow the computation of an optimal decision, and the only complicatedness allowed is 
that introduced at the discretion of the analyst in the form of market imperfections. When admitted, 
uncertainty takes the form of information asymmetry and costly search (Connor, 1991).  
The RBV under the rational-equilibrium approach has tried to make contributions in elucidating 
the characteristics of resources that yield sustainable rents and outlining the market imperfections that 
account for the rents. This allows managers to analyze their resource markets (albeit retrospectively and 
therefore irrelevant for strategy-making), to identify rent generating ones, and to gain better understanding 
of their resources and their firm. On a theoretical level, several authors commend the RBV for its 
integrative potential, as its literature has brought together concepts from several fields in strategy and 
economics (Foss, 1997; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Mahoney, 1995). Mahoney & Pandian (1992) argue 
that resource-based theory is able to sustain a conversation among different disciplines, which is, 
according to them and contrary to Thomas Kuhn (1962) (incommensurability), the mark of a good theory. 
Connor (1991) claims that the RBV provides the seeds of an alternative theory of the firm in place of the 
flawed neoclassical model. The RBV provides an explanation for the existence and scope of the firm, as 
opposed to purely market transactions - a rather academic interest as nobody really doubted that firms 
exist. According to the RBV, the firm exists to assemble valuable resources for productive opportunities 
that would otherwise be difficult or very costly (transaction wise) to utilize through market transactions. 
This means it is more efficient to organize these productive activities within the firm. For the firm’s scale 
and scope, Connor mentions the resource based explanation based on the specificity or relatedness of the 
new project to the firm’s existing resource base. High degrees of relatedness provide inducements for the 
firm to expand into the related areas (Connor, 1991).    18
  These contributions of the RBV are not without costs. Despite portraying itself as non-traditional 
the RBV has failed to show where it differs from mainstream economics. The combination of the 
rationality assumption, the modeling of the firm in terms of optimization of profit functions and the 
utilization of equilibrium analysis have led to a static, abstracted view of the firm that misses out on the 
rich organizational and managerial dimensions that it claims it is interested in. The RBV fails to account 
for dynamic issues deemed to be central to treatments of firm strategy and growth. Empirical tests 
conducted at the industry level are deemed inadequate for testing phenomena that take place at the level of 
the individual firm and below.  
Foremost is the critique of the rationality postulate, which, to say the least, has proven to be 
glaringly detached from managerial decision making reality. Mahoney (2005) considers the issue to be 
settled beyond dispute.  
“There can no longer be any doubt that the micro-analytic assumptions of neoclassical economic 
theory – the assumptions of perfect rationality – are contrary to fact. It is not a question of 
approximation; the assumptions of perfect rationality do not even remotely describe the processes 
humans use for making decisions in complex business situations. Moreover, there is an alternative. 
If anything, there is an embarrassing richness of alternatives.” (Mahoney, 2005:52)  
Extensive critique of the rationality assumption can be found in the work of Herbert Simon on 
bounded rationality, for which he was awarded the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economics, as well as other 
heterodox economists’ work, such as Nelson and Winter (1982). As for the drawbacks of employing the 
rationality assumption in management and strategy research, authors such as Huehn (2005) and Bromiley 
& Paupenhausen (2001) have discussed the issue extensively. Suffice it to say here that the rationality 
postulate (that is what it is) is a conceptual distortion imposed on managerial behavior for the sole reason 
that it renders possible the mathematical modeling of social phenomena under optimization methodology. 
Besides employing the rationality assumption, analysis in the rational-equilibrium school, which 
utilizes equilibrium methodology based on comparative statics, is inadequate “… because it involves 
applying a timeless equilibrium model to an inherently dynamic reality.” (Foss, 1996:181) The 
equilibrium-based methodology of the RBV fails to capture important dynamic aspects such as learning 
and innovation, and cannot account for the process of creation of competitive advantage. Eighty years ago,   19
Schumpeter, with piercing insight, criticized this aspect of economic equilibrium analysis, “… the problem 
that is usually being visualized is how capitalism administers existing structures, whereas the relevant 
problem is how it creates and destroys them.” (Schumpeter, 1942/1994:84) Resource-based analyses 
which do not draw on neoclassical economics, and use the new IO methodology based on game theory 
suffer from the same shortcomings. Foss (1996) elaborates that in such studies heterogeneity among firms 
arises from differences in resource endowments or market environments, and are thus fixed and given. 
There is no room for learning (which Penrose and mainstream management scholars like Hamel, 
Mintzberg and others assume to be critical for strategy-making) or for deliberate creative acts by managers 
that may differentiate firms. The calculative powers of agents enable them to foresee all possible moves in 
current and future stages of the game, and calculate the optimal solution. Therefore,  
“…there cannot be any failed strategies and wrong conjectures, no need for restructuring 
organizations in the face of , for example, new competition from innovative entrants, no 
‘emergent’ (unintended) strategies (Mintzberg 1994), and no accumulation of resources (except in 
a trivial way by learning by doing) – in short, there can be no process.” (Foss, 1996:186)  
This abstraction of dynamics and of the managerial role is exacerbated by the use of market level 
explanations related to strategic factor market imperfections to account for phenomena that essentially take 
place and assume importance inside the business organization. Accordingly, empirical studies are 
conducted at the industry level and comprise cross sectional analyses based on secondary, publicly 
available data (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988) intended to measure aspects that are supposed to be 
idiosyncratic and specific to the firm (Schulze, 1994). This shortcoming is again due to the nature of the 
tools that economic theory utilizes to look at the phenomenon of sustained competitive advantage. Finally, 
formal economic models fail to capture important qualitative differences among resources as well as soft 
factors that are central to strategy such as vision, intuition and creativity. Penrose’s important distinction 
between the objective characteristics of resources and the specific manner in which they are deployed 
within a particular firm is not emphasized in the rational equilibrium school (Schulze, 1994). Interestingly 
Penrose, the purported source of resource-based ideas, has explicitly criticized the use of neoclassical price 
theory for the study of firm growth. “We shall be dealing with the firm as a growing organization, not as a 
‘price and output decision maker’ for given products; for this purpose, the ‘firm’ must be endowed with   20
many more attributes than are possessed by the ‘firm’ in the [economic] theory of the firm, and the 
significance of these attributes is not conveniently represented by cost and revenue curves.” (Penrose, 
1959:14) In a footnote on the same page, Penrose states that “The economist’s ‘main conceptual schema’ is 
designed for the theory of price determination and resource allocation, and it is unnecessary and 
inappropriate to try to reconcile this theory with ‘organization theory’” (Penrose, 1959:14)   
Overall these naive assumptions lead to a theory that seems to be more concerned with ex-post 
explanations than prediction. One may ask how such a theory can claim to be useful for strategy, when 
strategy undoubtedly is concerned with the future, not the past. Scholars of the RBV who would agree with 
the above critique of the rational-equilibrium approach tend to find the solutions to its problems in the 
approach taken by the behavioral-evolutionary school, which is described next. 
 
4.  The Behavioural-Evolutionary School 
The literature of the behavioral-evolutionary school is less homogenous than the rational-
equilibrium school (RBV) literature. The school’s identifying characteristic is its attempt to focus on the 
dynamic and process aspects of the RBV, by relaxing some of the limiting assumptions of mainstream IO 
and adopting alternative forms of economic analysis. Authors belonging to this school include Amit & 
Schoemaker (1993), Teece et al. (1990, 1997), Teece (2007), Helfat et al. (2007) and others. The 
theoretical contributions in this school draw on the behavioral theory of Simon’s Administrative Behavior 
(1945/1997), Cyert & March’s A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (1963/1992) or on the evolutionary 
economics of Nelson & Winter (1982). Work in this school is consistent with strategy process research 
(Helfat et al., 2007; Schulze, 1994) and includes a vast amount of literature, comprising several identifiable 
research streams such as resource-based research, capabilities based literature (Dosi, Nelson & Winter, 
2000; Kogut & Zander, 1992), dynamic capabilities (Helfat et. al., 2007; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997) 
and some of the literature on the competence perspective (Foss & Knudsen, 1996). A comprehensive 
review of this massive literature is a considerable task that is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, the 
aim here is to provide an outline of the main substantive considerations explored in research belonging to 
the behavioral-evolutionary school, and from there to examine the underlying assumptions, methodology 
and the general perspective from which this school springs. The analysis elucidates areas of overlap with   21
the rational-equilibrium RBV as well as areas where the behavioral-evolutionary school improves on the 
shortcomings of the RBV. 
 
4.1  A Conceptual Outline of the Behavioral-Evolutionary School  
The substantive content of the behavioral-evolutionary school is distinguished from the rational-
equilibrium RBV by its focus on dynamic process aspects, both technological and organizational in nature. 
In this respect, it draws on some of Penrose’s ideas and overlaps with the rational-equilibrium RBV on 
some of the latter’s foundational ideas, but also goes beyond it. Early contributors to this school include 
Richardson (1972), Teece (1980, 1982) and Nelson & Winter (1982). Richardson argues that 
“organizations will tend to specialize in activities for which their capabilities offer some comparative 
advantage” (Richardson, 1972:888), in other words, activities that require the same or very similar sets of 
knowledge, experience and skills. These similar activities may lead the firm into diverse markets. 
Similarity in this sense, is distinguished from the complementarity of activities (such as car tires and cars). 
The activities of designing and making an engine are dissimilar (in terms of capabilities) to those of 
making car tires, so they are produced by different firms. Due to the need for harmonization, there are 
forms of intense cooperation and coordination among automakers and parts subcontractors that transcend 
the market. Although this argument bears some resemblance to analysis in transaction cost economics 
dealing with inter-firm relations, Richardson considers capabilities/competences as the central factor 
motivating cooperation rather than the minimization of transaction costs and opportunism. Similarly, 
Teece (1982) proposes an explanation for diversification based on efficiency considerations, showing that 
the assets organized by a firm have greater value when assembled internally than when they are externally 
coordinated through the market. The higher efficiency of internal organization is due to the nature of 
organizational knowledge, which contains a tacit component that is exercised without conscious 
deliberation within the specific organizational context, and is therefore irreducible to individual 
knowledge. Other reasons include the generation of excess managerial and technical resources through 
learning and the interchangeable or ‘fungible’ characteristic of organizational capabilities, which allows 
their use in various products without impairing their functioning for any of the products. Teece emphasizes 
that market failure prevents a firm from selling its usable inputs to other firms, which makes it more   22
efficient for a firm to diversify, than for two firms to specialize and trade on the market (Teece, 1980). He 
further elaborates four classes of resource-based scope economies that result in higher efficiency for 
diversified firms, using transaction costs logic (Teece, 1982).  
Teece’s and Richardson’s contributions reflect the central role that the concept of organizational 
capabilities plays in the behavioral-evolutionary school. While the RBV scholars use the concept of 
‘resources’ in broad terms, the emphasis on processes and interactions among human, material and 
intangible resources gives rise to the capabilities concept. Nelson & Winter, who devote a part of their 
(1982) landmark, An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (1982), to an “Organization-Theoretic 
Foundation” of their evolutionary theory, propose that the essence of organizational capabilities is 
organizational knowledge (Dosi et. al, 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982). Organizational capabilities involve 
knowledge of how to accomplish “…a smooth sequence of coordinated behavior that is ordinarily 
effective relative to its objectives, given the context in which it normally occurs.” (Nelson & Winter, 
1982:73) This knowledge may exist in a codified form such as blue prints, manuals or firm documentation, 
or it may exist in a more tacit form in the minds and actions of experts, and is manifest in the form of 
organizational routines. An organizational routine can be defined as a “…coordinated activity” (Nelson & 
Winter, 1982:97) performed by one or more subunits in the organization, which involves “…behavior that 
is learned, highly patterned, repetitious, or quasi-repetitious, founded in part in tacit knowledge” (Winter, 
2003:991). Nelson & Winter have provided a detailed discussion on organizational routines in their 
evolutionary theory. They draw the metaphor that organizational routines to firms play the role of skills in 
individuals. According to evolutionary economic theory, organizational routines are repositories of 
organizational knowledge, and thus represent organizational memory. Organizational capabilities are made 
up of bundles of organizational routines (Dosi et al., 2000). However, organizational capabilities are also 
made up of individual skills, competences and other organizational resources. Winter defines an 
organizational capability as“…a high level routine (or collection of routines) that, together with its 
implementing input flows, confers upon an organization’s management a set of decision options for 
producing significant outputs of a particular type.” (Winter, 2003:991)  
The focus on capabilities in the behavioral-evolutionary school is intimately related to the types of 
economic rents, or competitive advantages that are under focus in this school. As Teece (1980, 1982) and   23
Richardson (1972) explain, firms are heterogeneous with respect to the level of efficiency their particular 
capabilities confer upon them, and this accounts for heterogeneity in firm performance. In addition to 
efficiency rents, Teece explains that some resources may be of higher value when employed inside the 
firm, possibly due to complementarity advantages in combination with other firm-specific capabilities, as 
in the case of co-specialized assets. In such situations, quasi rents accrue to the firm, which represent the 
difference in returns between the first and second-best use of the assets.  
Work in the behavioral-evolutionary school is distinguished by its focus on the dynamics of firm 
capabilities. Consistent with evolutionary theory, scholars of the behavioral-evolutionary school emphasize 
the importance of path dependence and history in the emergence of capabilities underlying superior 
performance. Moreover, some technological changes may be advantageous to some firms, whose 
capabilities are suited to conditions brought about by the radical change. The school overlaps with some of 
the literature on technology strategy, in which some studies go beyond the firm level, and examine trends 
at the meso-level, like the literature on technological systems (Carlsson, 1997; Carlsson, 2002) and 
technological regimes (Malerba & Orsenigo 1993, 1997; Pavitt, 1984). Other authors examine capabilities 
and their evolution at the industry level (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). One particularly influential strand of this 
school examines the notion of Dynamic Capabilities, which are higher order routines or capabilities that 
operate on other organizational capabilities to modify, develop or reconfigure them (Helfat et al., 2007; 
Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997).  
  Diversification and inter-firm alliances are also main concerns of the behavioral-evolutionary 
school, allowing an organization to tap on capabilities and resources that reside in other organizations. Due 
to the tacit, embedded and co-specialized nature of organizational capabilities and their underlying 
routines, acquisitions are viewed as ways of acquiring whole bundles of resources and capabilities through 
the acquisition of firms or business units. These acquisitions may have a path-deepening effect on the 
acquirer when the acquired unit’s capabilities are related to the acquirer’s (Karim & Mitchell, 2000). 
Acquisitions may also function to reconfigure a firm’s base of routines and capabilities (Karim & Mitchell, 
2000; Teece, 2007; Teece et al., 1997) in case a firm is not looking for incremental improvements, and 
wants to gain new bodies of knowledge that are unrelated or path-breaking (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000;   24
Karim & Mitchell, 2000). Inter-firm alliances and networks are also viewed as sources that may augment 
the organization’s capabilities.  
 
4.2  The Underlying Framework of the Behavioral-Evolutionary School 
  In terms of epistemology, this school is very similar to the rational-equilibrium school regarding 
its fundamental belief in the existence of an objective reality facing managers and firms, which if known to 
them, would dictate optimal solutions to their problems and decisions. In other words, the behavioral-
evolutionary school also subscribes to positivist epistemology. However, this school is more modest 
regarding the perceptive powers imputed to managers. According to Simon, managers are presumed to be 
boundedly rational and to make decisions based on satisficing rather than optimizing. Nelson & Winter 
follow Simon in proposing that managers make decisions based on heuristics, or crude rules of thumb 
(Nelson & Winter 1982). Thus, behavioral assumptions following the contributions of Simon (1945/1997, 
1982) differentiate between the ‘real’ objective environment that exists independently of managers’ 
perceptions of it, and the perceived environment, which is plagued with the flaws and biases of human 
cognition.  
  In the behavioral-evolutionary school, the middle way is adopted concerning the issue of 
environmental determinism. While some degree of inertia exists and preserves heterogeneity among firms 
in initial capabilities and historical trajectories on which future paths are dependent, organizations can also 
alter their capabilities (Helfat, 2003). Since firms act and are acted upon, evolutionary theory makes 
possible the endogenous generation of heterogeneity in organizational capabilities. Accordingly, managers 
play an important role because investment in strategic capabilities is “… a highly complex uncertain 
process that cannot be reduced to algorithms.” (Schulze, 1994:13) Amit & Schoemaker (1993) emphasize 
that it is the presence of uncertainty, complexity and conflict that gives strategy and managers such 
important roles in bringing about heterogeneity in firm capabilities and performance. An interesting stream 
of research regarding the role of managers examines the shortcomings of human cognition. Decision biases 
and flaws in perception are factored in (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand & Lampel, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1974), and their effects on organizational capabilities and outcomes are explored (Helfat et al., 2007). In 
this cognitive stream of the behavioral-evolutionary school, the gaps between managerial cognitive biases   25
and the objective reality of the situation gleaned by researchers (retrospectively) account for unfavorable 
organizational outcomes (Barr, Stimpert & Huff, 1992; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). Overall, the behavioral-
evolutionary school relaxes (but does not rid itself of) many of the limiting and unrealistic assumptions of 
the rational-equilibrium school. This provides for a somewhat richer view of organizational resources and 
capabilities where there is no single best way for all organizations. Rather, organizational capabilities are 
equifinal, which means that different organizations can reach similar outcomes by various means 
(Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000). “Given the competitive and changing context in which managers must decide 
which R&C [resources and capabilities] to develop as their firm’s basis for competition, it is doubtful that 
decisions about which SA [strategic assets] to develop and deploy can be optimally deduced from a general 
normative theory. More likely, continually changing heuristics will emerge that strive to better incorporate 
the uncertainty, complexity and organizational conflicts confronting managers.” (Amit & Schoemaker, 
1993:40) The school also takes account of the effects of extra-managerial considerations (Schulze, 1994) 
such as organizational learning (Zollo & Winter, 2002), organizational culture (Barney, 1986) and politics 
(Amit & Schoemaker, 1993).  
  Commensurate with the wide range of issues considered in the behavioral-evolutionary school, the 
empirical work displays a rich diversity. Empirical studies include quantitative statistical research carried 
out on both primary survey as well as secondary data; some studies also feature simulations. There is also 
qualitative research and single or small sample case studies focusing on intangibles such as skills and 
capabilities that cannot be fully owned or controlled. A large part of the empirical work in this school takes 
the form of firm performance being a function of the interaction between capabilities and organizational 
processes or a function of qualitative differences in resources and capabilities (Schulze, 1994). 
  The behavioral-evolutionary school is looked upon as the promising way forward for the RCC 
approach, since it suffers to a lesser degree from many limitations of the rational equilibrium RBV (Foss, 
1996, 1997; Schulze, 1994). The most commonly reiterated strengths lie in the school’s treatment of the 
dynamic and process-oriented facets of organizational capabilities, its more realistic treatment of the 
uncertainty and complexity facing boundedly rational managers, combined with the rigorous formal 
theoretical tools offered by evolutionary economic theory. The school does undoubtedly make relevant 
contributions to our understanding of organizational routines, capabilities, issues of path dependence and   26
organizational inertia and the evolution of capabilities at both the firm and industry level. However, a 
major shortcoming is the cavalier treatment of learning and the vagueness concerning how organizational 
routines and capabilities contribute to the strategy-making process. The social constructionist school, of 
which Hamel & Prahalad’s Core Competence approach (1989, 1990, 1993, 1994) is the most important 
example, is focusing exactly on these aspects. 
 
5.  The Social Constructionist School 
What sets the third school in the RCC approach apart from the other two is its underlying 
epistemology which emphasizes the social construction of knowledge and reality. Most influential in this 
school is Prahalad & Hamel’s The Core Competence of the Corporation which is just one part of these 
authors’ more comprehensive view displayed in their book Competing For the Future (1994) as well as a 
couple of other influential articles published in the HBR. Among the schools of the RCC approach, the 
constructionist school and specifically Hamel & Prahalad’s ideas are the closest to Penrose’s (1959) 
insights. Their ideas highly resemble the earlier work on the subject done by Itami & Roehl Mobilizing 
Invisible Assets (1987). The epistemic characteristics of this school are also related to several other 
important characteristics, including its forms of theorizing and empirical work, its focus on the dynamic 
aspects of competence/capability creation rather than sustenance of existing advantages, its depiction of 
the relation between firm and environment and its implications for the degree of strategic choice imputed 
to managers (Huehn 2008). Before examining these facets of the school’s underlying framework, we 
briefly describe its substantive focus. 
 
5.1  A Conceptual Outline of the Social Constructionist School 
  Similar to the previous schools, the current one also concerns itself with RCC based explanations 
for superior business performance. The most prominent authors in this respect are Penrose (1959), Itami & 
Roehl (1987), Nonaka & Takeuchi (1995), Spender (1996, 1998), Kim & Mauborgne (2005) as well as 
Prahalad & Hamel (1989, 1990, 1993, 1994). The constructionist school can uniquely be identified among 
the approaches dealing with resources by its focus on the creation of new competences or capabilities, 
most of which are intangible (Itami & Roehl 1987), knowledge-based (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Spender   27
1996, 1998) and collective in nature (Penrose, 1959; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). In its focus on creation, it 
is the most dynamic among the resource-based approaches. The constructionist school acknowledges that 
competitive advantages are based on firm-specific resources such as technological competencies, 
knowledge and other intangibles that are not quickly imitated and thus provide for an advantage that can be 
sustained. However, the school attaches prime importance to the continual regeneration of these sources of 
advantage as the only guarantor of superior performance in the long term. “The essence of strategy lies in 
creating tomorrow’s competitive advantages faster than competitors mimic the ones you possess today (…) 
An organization’s capacity to improve existing skills and learn new ones is the most defensible competitive 
advantage of all.” (Hamel & Prahalad, 1989:69) This creation of new advantages is possible by means of 
consistent focused investment in a few broad lines of expertise (core competences) that is infused with 
adequate ambiguity regarding the means and the short term goals, which allows for emergent 
organizational learning (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). Further, the focus on creation takes the discussion to 
the ex ante phase of managerial decision and action, where decisions have to be made about strategic 
directions and resource investments in the midst of highly uncertain and complex circumstances. Most 
empirical studies in the rational-equilibrium and behavioral RCC schools that examine firm-specific 
resources and capabilities explain past firm performance, which does not help managers who need to act 
for the future (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993). The benefit of hindsight, which researchers utilize to put 
together objective analyses ex post, is not available to managers ex ante. It is for this reason that the 
constructionist school stresses creativity, resourcefulness and entrepreneurial qualities and avoids models 
which have cooking-recipe character.  
 
5.2  The Underlying Framework of the Social Constructionist School 
  While all economical theories (including the two other schools discussed) assume an objective, 
separate world knowable with accuracy, the constructionist school takes on the assumption that a single 
objective world ‘out there’ simply does not exist. The relevant world or environment is the subjective 
environment that is specific and idiosyncratic to the firm or manager of interest. The constructionist 
approach considers that the worlds or environments of managers and organizational members are actively 
constructed by them, and represent their particular and subjective creation, to which they adapt and   28
respond. This may sound quite exotic, but when viewed through the eyes of a strategist, it becomes very 
plausible. Strategists are interested in the future and the future does not simply happen to us, it is 
created/influenced by human actions: markets consist of humans trying to get or create the best deal for 
themselves. Markets are not places where impersonal forces walk on a preset path towards a known future. 
That means that strategy as prediction is replaced by strategy as creation
2 as information from the 
surroundings of actors interacts with their internal dispositions or tendencies and what results is a creation 
and not a (flawed) mirroring of reality. In the words of Henry Mintzberg,  
“…what is inside the human mind is not a reproduction of the external world. All that information 
flowing in through those filters, supposedly to be decoded by those cognitive maps, in fact 
interacts with cognition and is shaped by it. The mind, in other words, imposes some interpretation 
on the environment – it constructs its world. In a sense, the mind has a mind of its own – it 
marches to its own cognitive dynamics. Or perhaps we might better say they march, because there 
is a collective dimension to this too: people interact to create their mental worlds.”(Mintzberg et 
al., 1998:165)  
  This epistemology is markedly distinct from the behavioral school’s view that cognition is at best a 
highly simplified and flawed reflection of reality. “What the one sees as the basis for distortion, the other 
takes as the opportunity for creation.” (Mintzberg et al., 1998:170) Following the views of Berger & 
Luckman (1966), within a collective context, these individual constructions of knowledge and of reality 
take on an objective or separate existence as they continue to exist beyond the time and place of their 
original construction, through socialization and internalization. However, the creation of reality is a 
dynamic and continuous process of construction, which implies that there is no logical inevitability, even 
with all of the inertial forces working to keep it in place. It is this ever present, but insufficiently 
acknowledged, capacity to create new reality that is the focus of the constructionist school. In order for it 
to become relevant to strategy it needed a focus (strategic intent - Hamel & Prahalad, 1989) and a process 
through which the future that is created gives the firm a sustainable competitive advantage (learning). The 
Core Competence program tries to deliver both ingredients. 
                                            
2 For an in-depth discussion we recommend Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s (1997) brilliant essay on uncertainty and 
rationality. He shows the logical flaws in classical economical thinking when it comes to assumptions about human 
behavior. (p.35 1st paragraph)   29
  The implications of a constructionist epistemology are discernible in this school’s view of actor 
(manager) rationality. There is no assumption of a singular form of rationality such as maximizing profit; 
however, multiple rationalities are assumed (Huehn, 2005; Schoemaker, 1990). In addition, factors that fall 
outside the realm of conscious and calculable rationality, such as vision and intuition are realistically 
acknowledged as central features of management (Mintzberg et al., 1998). Lindblom’s (1959) work on 
how messy decision making is in complex organizations as well as Mintzberg & Waters’ (1985) work on 
emergent strategies are relevant to the depiction of managers under the constructionist perspective. In this 
school, strategy is conceived through incremental or revolutionary learning under a broad strategic 
direction, rather than through deliberate and rational choice. In addition to multiple individual rationalities, 
the collective (social) dimension of organization features prominently in the constructionist school in such 
central concepts as organizational learning. Overall, the constructionist assumptions contradict the 
‘rational’ management views described earlier, and present a more realistic view with which most 
managers can relate to (Mintzberg et al., 1998). 
  The constructionist school’s underlying epistemology has unique implications for describing the 
boundaries of the organization and the relationship of the firm with its environment. As emphasized 
earlier, social constructionism does not view the environment as a single objective existence discoverable 
by means of facts and governed by natural or social laws that dictate an optimal behavior that defines 
success in business. Rather, the delineation of organization from ‘not-the-organization’ is quite fuzzy as 
both the organization and its environment are created by the interactions among members of organizations. 
The concept of an organization’s environment, that is normally seen to consist of customers, suppliers, 
competitors and other stakeholders, becomes difficult to define with precision. The boundaries separating 
what is inside and what is outside are not clearly demarcated as  
“… the actors themselves create the environment to which they adapt ... Rather than talking about 
adapting to an external environment, it may be more correct to argue that organizing consists of 
adapting to an enacted environment, an environment which is constituted by the actions of 
interdependent human actor ... This reasserts the argument that the environment is a phenomenon 
tied to processes of attention, and that unless something is attended to it doesn’t exist. While this is 
a rather radical turnabout in the way environments are usually discussed, there is precedent for   30
this view in organization theory itself, … in empirical research … and in theories of how people 
discover knowledge.” (Weick, 1969:27-28)  
  The concept of an enacted environment suggests very different implications for strategy-making 
from the objective and perceived environments of the rational equilibrium and behavioral evolutionary 
schools respectively. Smircich & Stubbart (1985) show that when managers view the environment and the 
organization as being enacted by their (and others’) thoughts and actions, the traditional prescription that 
the organization must adapt to its environment ceases to be of importance. Managers start to see 
themselves as creators of their own opportunities and threats so instead of looking externally to allocate 
blame and find remedies to their problems, they look to themselves and how their perspectives and actions 
have contributed to their situation. This view brings empowering strategic choice back to managers and 
members of an organization. Other perspectives, that include some of the work in the behavioral-
evolutionary school, allow for some influence by organizations over their environments, but they see that 
the organization must necessarily adapt to contingencies in the environment over which it has no control 
(Weick, 1969; Helfat et al., 2007). However, Weick (1969) emphasizes that the constructionist approach 
asserts the strong form of this argument, claiming that organizations are always actively constructing their 
environments.  
The constructionist school shares a number of interests with the behavioral-evolutionary school, 
which leads the majority of scholars to treat the former as a part of the latter. However, there are 
fundamental differences between the two approaches about basic assumptions and methodological choices. 
The first and most salient difference is the reliance on economics as a base discipline. The constructionist 
school is unique among the RCC approaches as it does not draw on formal economic theory, whether in its 
neoclassical form, IO and game theoretic form, transaction cost or evolutionary economics. However, it 
draws heavily on Schumpeter’s ideas on creative destruction and innovation (Schumpeter, 1934; 
1942/1994). Further, it takes organization theory and other social sciences such as sociology, cognitive and 
social psychology as its disciplinary base. As a consequence of the underlying epistemological framework 
and the base disciplines, the form of theorizing in the constructionist school is what Nelson & Winter 
(1982) have referred to as ‘appreciative theorizing’. This means that theories in the constructionist school 
do not use formal mathematical theorizing based on axiomatic deductive logic, as is the dominant   31
methodology in the range of economic approaches dealing with organizational issues. In the words of 
neoclassical economic theory, instead of optimizing a production function, the constructionist school is 
concerned with the creation of new production and cost functions. As Schumpeter notes, “Carrying out a 
new plan and acting according to a customary one are things as different as making a road and walking 
along it” (Schumpeter, 1934: 85). The process is a highly uncertain and complex one involving an 
interaction among strategic directions of managers, human systems that involve social, psychological and 
political dimensions, material resources and organizational processes. Here, the qualitative attributes of 
organizational capabilities are of central importance and may become entirely distorted when quantified 
and operationalized, as quantification tends to dilute the descriptively rich nuances that make firms 
qualitatively different (Conner, 1991). In addition, factors such as stretch (Itami & Roehl, 1987), leverage 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1993), synergy (Penrose, 1959), vision, intuition and creativity (Mintzberg & Westley, 
2001; Schumpeter, 1934) that are central to effectiveness considerations in the constructionist school defy 
mathematical modeling that can at best tackle issues of efficiency, and treats these factors as chance 
events. Empirical work in the constructionist school is carried out from an interpretative perspective 
(Mintzberg et al., 1998), trying to capture the subjective views of managers, dealing with issues from 
multiple standpoints (Smircich & Stubbart, 1985), and preserving the incommensurability of quantitative 
and qualitative dimensions (Huehn, 2005). Large sample quantitative designs are ill suited for such 
purposes as they tend to look for general rules governing the behavior of groups or populations of 
individuals or firms, leaving out the random and idiosyncratic elements, as well as the outliers (Aharoni, 
1993). It is the few exceptional organizations that interest the researchers in this school and thus anecdotal 
information is preferred over statistical information. The RCC approach to strategy emphasizes 
uniqueness, and thus empirical research would not seek out similarities between firms, but rather 
differences. “Thus in the best of all worlds, resource-based theory would be aimed at generalizing about 
uniqueness, which clearly is impossible” (Connor 1991: 144) In-depth qualitative designs as well as 
longitudinal and historical methods are more suited to the nature of the problems tackled from the 
constructionist perspective. Authors who have reviewed the literature of the RCC approach have noted the 
similarity between the constructionist and the behavioral-evolutionary schools in taking a dynamic, 
process-oriented approach to the creation of resources and of new competitive advantages (Foss, 1997;   32
Foss & Knudsen 1996; Mahoney, 1995; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Schulze, 1994). However, most 
authors have not shown adequate appreciation of the massive differences between the two schools. 
Actually, all of the above mentioned authors place the work of Prahalad & Hamel within the same 
category as research in the behavioral-evolutionary approach. While there are some superficial overlaps, 
for instance in the common focus on technological and organizational capabilities, intangible aspects such 
as knowledge and learning, and collective processes, there are indeed non-trivial differences rooted in the 
epistemology and the basic assumptions.  
 
6. Conclusion 
  This paper aimed at bringing some structure to a debate about what was previously assumed to be 
one of the most important research programs in strategy but which turned out to be three more or less 
loosely connected research programs (Table 1 in the appendix gives the reader a structured overview). We 
hope to have shown that the commonalities between the three programs are surprisingly superficial while 
the differences are rather profound. It is fairly safe to assume that research in any given field will progress 
much faster if researchers are fully aware of their own epistemological and contextual position vis-a-vis 
other researchers/research programs. Only from this basis can a meaningful and focused scientific debate 
emerge that pushes forward the boundaries of research. It may come as a surprise just how disinterested 
scientists seem to be in structuring their research field and how little regard they seem to have for the 
philosophy of science. It can be assumed that this laissez-faire attitude has hindered progress in the RCC 
approach for some time and has resulted in widespread confusion about the most basic issues. We hope 
that this paper can improve the understanding of the idiosyncracies of the three strands and thereby start a 
meaningful debate between and within the three research programs. The three programs seem to be 
interested in different aspects and maybe a division of labor can further improve the understanding of the 
whole field. The two more economically oriented programs seem to be more focused on distinguishing 
between the firm and its market and the respective roles of both, while especially the Core Competence 
approach focuses on firm-specific learning processes which produce competences or capabilities. Thus, 
even if a co-operation between the research programs proves impracticable (due to the incommensurability 
of assumptions) research can move forward independently.    33
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Table (1) 
The Three Schools of the RCC Approach 
  Rational – Equilibrium School  Behavioral – Evolutionary School  Social Constructionist School 
Epistemology  Positivist Positivist  Constructivist 
Basic Assumptions 
Manager  Managers are rational; they 
optimize 
Managers are bounded rational; they 
satisfice 
Managers are entrepreneurs: they synthesize 
and create 
Environment  Objective; independent; accurately 
measured by managers 
Objective; independent; inaccurately 
perceived by managers 
Subjective; enacted; created by managerial 
cognition & action 
Degree of Strategic 
Choice 
Minimal: exogenous market forces 
determine firm behavior 
Moderate: firms act on the market and 
are acted upon by its forces 
Maximal: firms create themselves and their 
markets 
Implications of Basic Assumptions 
Substantive Focus 
Retrospective, static; Which 
resources yield sustained rents in 
equilibrium? What mechanisms 
sustain rents? 
Retrospective, dynamic: How do 
markets co-evolve with firm 
capabilities and technologies?  
Prospective, dynamic: How do firms create 
future markets through learning new 
competences and creating new knowledge? 




optimization; game theory 
Hypothetico-deductive; mix of formal 
mathematical and appreciative 
theorizing; evolutionary game theory;  
Appreciative theorizing 
Empirical 
Quantitative; large sample 
statistical analyses; industry or 
market level data;  
Mix of quantitative and qualitative 
methods; simulation and historical 
study 
Mostly qualitative; case study, anecdotal 
evidence  
Base Discipline  Industrial organization economics   Behavioral economics; evolutionary 
economics 
Schumpeter’s entrepreneurial theory; 
organization theory; social and cognitive 
psychology 
Theoretical Roots   Bain; Mason; Demsetz  Schumpeter; Simon; Cyert & March; 
Richardson; Nelson & Winter  Schumpeter; Penrose  
Contemporary 
Authors 
Wernerfelt; Barney; Rumelt; 
Helfat; Peteraf; Montgomery  
Teece; Nelson; Winter; Dosi; 
Carlsson; 
Hamel; Prahalad; Nonaka & Takeuchi; 
Spender; Itami & Roehl; Schoemaker 
Current Research 
Streams  Resource-based theory & research 
Organizational capabilities; routines; 
dynamic capabilities; technology 
strategy; industrial dynamics and 
technological change 
Core competence research; knowledge creation; 
organizational learning 